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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 
 
Summary 
 The Court considered the State’s appeal from a district court order granting the 
defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea and to dismiss the criminal case under Nevada’s 
prosecutorial immunity statutes, NRS 178.572 and NRS 178.574.   
Disposition 
 First, the Court concluded that when testimony has been compelled of a defendant, the 
Nevada immunity statutes grant transactional immunity.  Second, when a testifying defendant 
obtains transactional immunity in exchange for his or her testimony after he or she has pled 
guilty to, but not yet sentenced for, an offense implicated by his or her testimony, the Nevada 
immunity statutes prevent further prosecution, including sentencing. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Having stopped a vehicle driven by Gary Taylor, the Nevada Highway Patrol found 
drugs, including methamphetamine, on the vehicle’s passenger, Shannon Tricas.  Tricas pled 
guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit a felony under the Uniform Controlled Substances 
Act.  Tricas then made a written statement for her presentence investigation report, explaining 
that the drugs belonged to Taylor and that she was motivated by her fear of Taylor to hold them.  
Based on this declaration, the State compelled Tricas to testify at Taylor’s preliminary hearing.  
The State filed a motion, which the justice court granted, requesting immunity for Tricas in 
exchange for her compelled testimony against Taylor. 
After involuntarily providing testimony against Taylor, Tricas filed a motion to have her 
case dismissed, a motion to have her plea withdrawn, and a request for hearing under NRS 
178.572 and NRS 178. 574.  NRS 178.572 provides that, on motion of the state, a court "may 
order that any material witness be released from all liability to be prosecuted or punished on 
account of any testimony or other evidence the witness may be required to produce."  NRS 
178.574 states that "[s]uch order of immunity shall forever be a bar to prosecution against the 
witness for any offense shown in whole or in part by such testimony or other evidence except for 
perjury committed in the giving of such testimony."   
 
 The district court granted the motion to dismiss and the motion to withdraw the plea. The 
State appealed.  
 
Discussion 
 Justice Gibbons wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court sitting en banc.   The question 
before the Court was whether a defendant, who has been granted immunity in exchange for her 
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compelled testimony, is protected under the Nevada immunity statutes when the defendant 
provides the testimony after she has already pled guilty, but before the court has imposed a 
sentence. 
 The State argued that immunity here only bars subsequent criminal prosecutions.  
Furthermore, there was no Fifth Amendment violation in prosecuting Tricas following her 
testimony.  Because she had already pled guilty, it was too late for the testimony to be used 
against her.  
 Tricas argued that because the immunity statutes confer transactional immunity, as 
opposed to the more narrow “use” or “derivative use” immunity, she could enjoy full amnesty 
regardless of the stage of the proceeding against her.   
The Court rejected the State’s argument that the immunity was limited to future 
prosecutions, concluding that the statutes confer broad transactional immunity.
2
  The Nevada 
legislature enacted the immunity statutes when transactional immunity was the only immunity 
recognized as agreeing with the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination.3  
Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the Illinois statute, from which the 
Nevada immunity statutes are modeled upon, as conferring transactional immunity.
4
  
 The plain language of NRS 178.572 precludes future prosecution as well as pending 
prosecution because is specifically references immunity for the prosecuted or the punished.  The 
Court concluded that the addition of the word “punished” clearly evidences the legislature’s 
intent to extend immunity to sentencing after the defendant has pled or been found guilty.  Even 
absent this language, transactional immunity would still prevent prosecution after a guilty plea 
because it is an absolute bar to all criminal actions related to the testimony,
5
 and sentencing is an 
essential component of prosecution.
6
  The Court further reasoned that compelled testimony can 
result in further incrimination or an increase in severity of the sentence, rejecting the State’s 
argument that no Fifth Amendment violation occurred.   
 Finally, the Court looked at immunizations conferred upon defendants in similar 
situations in other courts in an effort to determine whether immunization bars further prosecution 
even after a defendant has pled guilty.  Courts in Washington and Colorado agree that a 
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 However, the Court noted that use and derivative use immunity can be valid, but only when such immunity has 
been negotiated in a contractual situation. 
3
 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892). 
4
 See People ex rel Cruz v. Fitzgerald, 363 N.E.2d 835, 837 (Ill. 1977) (concluding its transactional immunity 
statutory language was clear and unambiguous); see also People v. Giokaris, 611 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993). 
5
 See NEV. REV. STAT. 178.574 (2007) (“Such order of immunity shall forever be a bar to prosecution. . . .”); see 
also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (explaining that transactional immunity "accords full 
immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates."). 
6
 See NEV. REV. STAT. 176.105 (2007) (providing that a judgment of conviction must include adjudication and the 
sentence); Steinberger v. Dist. Court in & for Tenth Judicial Dist., 596 P.2d 755, 758 (Colo. 1979) ("A recital of the 
sentence is an essential part of a judgment of conviction."). 
defendant will obtain immunity whenever his testimony could incriminate him or influence the 
court to impose a more severe penalty.
7
  
Conclusion 
 The Court affirmed the district court in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss and 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea.  
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 State v. McCullough, 744 P.2d 641, 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Steinberger, 665 P.2d at 757); Steinberger, 
596 P.2d at 758. 
